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Coulter: Coulter: Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS LITIGATION:
ACCRUAL OF THE
CAUSE OF ACTION
Kansas City v. W.R. Grace & Co.'

For decades, asbestos has been used in industry, ships, schools, and
homes. 2 It is used for insulation, cement products, roofing and flooring
products, and brake linings.3 This fibrous mineral is strong and
flexible.4 An important reason for its extensive use is its resistance to
heat, fire, and corrosion.' Unfortunately, asbestos also causes disease.
Asbestos fibers inhaled into the lungs may cause asbestosis (scarring of
the lungs which reduces breathing capacity) and various forms of cancer
including mesothelioma (fatal cancer of the lining of the chest and
abdomen).6
For this reason, there has been a widespread movement on the part
of building owners and schools to remove asbestos from their property.
This has resulted in a large amount of litigation to recover the costs of
containment or removal of the asbestos.7 Property damage caused by
asbestos raises some complicated legal questions. One of the most
complex issues faced by the courts is when
the cause of action accrues
8
for purposes of the statute of limitations.
Kansas City v. W.R. Grace & Co.9 focused on the accrual of a claim
for property damage caused by the presence of asbestos. The Missouri
Court of Appeals found that the cause of action did not accrue until the
asbestos fibers had contaminated the air to the extent that it became a

1. 778 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
2. D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE
COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS ToxIc TORTS 1 (1985) [hereinafter D.HENSLER].

3. J.

KAKALIK,

P. EBENER, W.

FELSTINER,

G.

HAGGSTROM & M. SHANLEY,

VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES

3 (1984)

[hereinafter J. KAKALIK].
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id.
7. See id. at 4.
8. See D. HENSLER, supra note 2, at 37-41.
9. 778 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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potential health hazard to the occupants."
In W.R. Grace & Co., the
court determined there "were genuine issues of material fact as to
when" the release of fibers reached an unacceptable level-a level that
would pose a health risk. Evidence had been introduced which
indicated that a risk had not been present until approximately 1985.
Because of this evidence, the court held that summary judgment should
not have been granted on the issues of negligence and strict liability."
I. THE FACTS
Kansas City, a municipal corporation, filed suit against ten
respondents who were in the business of manufacturing, selling, or
installing construction materials which contained asbestos.' 2 Kansas
City alleged property damage caused by the asbestos-containing
products manufactured and installed by the respondents at Kansas City
International Airport (KCI) and Kansas City Downtown Airport

(Downtown Airport).' 3
The Downtown Airport was constructed between 1958 and 1964.14
KCI was under construction from 1969 to 1972.1' The respondents
allegedly installed acoustical fireproofing and thermal
insulation
6
materials in the airport buildings during construction.'
Kansas City sought $20,000,000 in damages based upon the
following six theories of recovery: negligence, strict liability, breach of
implied warranty, breach of express warranty, fraud, and civil conspir17
acy.
Kansas City based its claim for negligence upon the respondents'
failure to warn the petitioners of the dangers of products containing
asbestos.' In addition, the petitioners alleged that the asbestos in the
respondents' product represented a concealed defect. 9

10. I&,at 269.
11. Id.
12. Id at 267. The following respondents were named: Keene Corporation,
U.S. Gypsum Company, Asbestospray Corporation, Fibreboard Corporation,
Armstrong World Industries, Inc., ACandS, Inc., H & A Construction Corporation, Asbestos Product Manufacturing Corporation and The Celotex Corporation.
Kansas City settled with W.R. Grace & Co. and stipulated to the dismissal of
other parties. Id.
13. Id at 267.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id- at 268.
19. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/12
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Kansas City alleged a breach of both express and implied warranties.'
Kansas City claimed the respondents breached the implied
warranty of merchantability at the Downtown Airport because the goods
were not fit for their ordinary purpose. 2 ' Kansas City also alleged
breach of express warranties of future performance at KCI. 22 This
claim was based upon respondents' representations that the products
were "safe, suitable for use, fully tested, and easy to maintain."'
Kansas City argued that these representations extended to future
performance.2
Kansas City also alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by the
respondentsY. The claim for fraud was based upon the material
representations made by the respondents that the products had been
fully tested, that they were safe, suitable for use in a public building,
and that very little maintenance would be required to keep the products
in a suitable condition.2
The final claim asserted by the petitioners was based upon civil
conspiracyY The petitioners alleged that the respondents acted in
concert to cause the damage.
Kansas City filed suit on August 12, 1986. 28 On September 25,
1987, however, respondents both jointly and as individuals moved for
summary judgement
based upon the expiration of the statute of
29
limitations.
Delineating the applicable law, the court stated that a cause of
action in tort for asbestos contamination does not accrue until the
presence of the asbestos particles has created an unreasonable risk of
harm. 30 The court noted that there must be "contamination" of the
environment before the cause of action could accrue because prior to
that event, damage would not have been sustained. 31 The petitioner
asserted there was no contamination prior to 1981; thus, the statute of
limitations should not bar its claims.32

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id at 267.
Id at 271.
Id.
Id
I&
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id at 273-74.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id.
See 1d.
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The respondents urged that Kansas City's knowledge of the harmful
effects of asbestos for many years prior to filing suit caused its claim for
damages to be barred by the statute of limitations.' The respondents
charged that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the hazards of
asbestos based upon seven sources of information.3 These sources
were as follows: Concerns during construction of KCI, National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS) Report,
Terminal A problems, The McCrone Report, National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Report, the City Health
Department, and scientific knowledge.3
During the construction of KCI in 1972, a representative of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recommended
the use of products which did not contain asbestos rather than the
asbestos-containing products actually used.' The substitute material
would have complied with OSHA regulations concerning asbestos
exposure.37
In addition, the respondents directed the court's attention to an
article in the Kansas City Star on April 14, 1972.' The article focused
on concerns that the construction workers at the airport were being
exposed to asbestos dust.9
The NESHAPS Report also was cited as proof of Kansas City's
knowledge of its claim.4" These regulations were developed and
published by the Environmental Protection Agency on April 6, 1973."'
The regulations banned the use of building materials that contained
greater than one percent asbestos.4 2 They also required the use of
certain methods for removal of the materials to prevent the release of
asbestos into the environment upon renovation or demolition of the
buildings.4 3
Respondents argued that Kansas City knew that asbestos was
flaking off coated beams in Terminal A at KCI as early as April of
1975.' OSHA'S analysis of the situation, however, showed that the

33. See id34. Id. at 268-71.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id, 778 S.W.2d at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id- at 269.
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level of asbestos fibers released were not above the specific limits set
forth under the federal regulations.4 5
Next, the respondents urged the court to find Kansas City had the
requisite knowledge for their claims to accrue based upon the McCrone
Report in 1976.46 Walter C. McCrone Associates tested the fireproofing
in Terminals B and C at KCI.47 This report, however, determined only
that asbestos was present in the terminals.4 8
The respondents presented the results of an evaluation of the
health hazards in Terminal B at KCI in 1977. 4 9 This test was conducted by NIOSH. ° The results demonstrated a potential exposure to
asbestos. 5' But the results also indicated that the hazard of asbestos
was not immediate.52 The report recommended a plan to either replace
the asbestos-containing products with a safer product or seal the
surfaces coated with asbestos to prevent the release of fibers into the
environment.5 3 This was presented as part of the regular maintenance
of the building.54
The respondents further claimed the city had knowledge based upon
the recommendation of the City Health Department.5 The manager
of the Environmental Hazards Section of Kansas City's Public Health
Department believed that, by August of 1980, the asbestos posed a risk
of serious health problems for the building's occupants.'
The final source of knowledge the respondents asserted was the
scientific community which had established, prior to 1981, that exposure
As the
to asbestos presented a substantial and unreasonable risk.
court pointed out, however, public health officials still believed there
was an acceptable level of asbestos to which one could be exposed
without harm.5

45. I&
46. Id at 270.
47. Id48. Id.
49. I&
50. Id.
51. I&
52. Id
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Thomas Myslinski was the manager of the Environmental Hazards
Section of the Kansas City Public Health Department. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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In 1985, Kansas City retained Hygienetics, Inc. to evaluate the
hazards of asbestos at KCI.59 The company was hired to inspect the
premises and assess the levels of asbestos in the environment. 60 The
evaluation stated there were no hazardous levels of asbestos in any of
the buildings. 61 The report did recommend that the asbestos-containing products be removed to eliminate the concern that the level of
asbestos in the air might increase in the future. 2 Kansas City filed
suit against the respondents within one year of receiving this report.
The trial court granted summary judgement in favor of the
respondents.6 Following the reasoning of the respondents, the court
declared that the cause of action had accrued prior to 1981. The trial
court cited the NESHAPS Report as proof of Kansas City's knowledge
of its claim.6 Then, the trial court cited several cases for the proposition that everyone is charged with notice of the contents of federal
regulations.' Thus, the trial court held that Kansas City was put on
of action and the claim was barred by the statute
notice of its cause
67
of limitations.
Kansas City appealed the decision to the Western District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court had erred in
entering summary judgement for the respondents.8 The court of
appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, stating there were
genuine
issues of material facts concerning accrual of the cause of
69
action.

The court stated that the petitioner's cause of action did not accrue
until toxic asbestos fibers were released into the environment and
created an unreasonable risk of harm.70 According to the appellate
court, the seven sources of knowledge urged by the respondents did not
cause Kansas City's claim to accrue. 7 ' The court concluded that

.59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 270-71.
62. Id. at 271.
63. Id. at 267.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947);
United States v. Marksgraf, 736 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1199
(1984)).
66. Id. at 269.
67. Id. at 268.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 268-75.
70. Id. at 268.
71. Id. at 275.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/12
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summary judgement was improper and should not have been granted.72 The basis of the court's decision was that until asbestos fibers
have contaminated the environment and created an unreasonable risk
of harm, a cause of action in tort has not accrued because the injured
party has not yet sustained damage that is capable of ascertainment.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Statutes of limitations are favored in the law. 3 Limiting the time
in which to bring an action is based upon sound reasons of public
policy. 4 The most important purpose is to prevent the assertion of
stale claims. This policy is supposed to safeguard defendants against
fraud or the memory loss of witnesses.
In turn, it promotes the
welfare and peace of society.7'
One of the most difficult aspects of applying a statute of limitation
is the starting point. The statute begins to ran when the cause of action
accrues. This concept is much more difficult to apply than it appears.
77
There are different statutes of limitations for each cause of action.
In addition, accrual may occur at different times for each claim. 78
In Missouri, the causes of action in negligence and strict liability
79
are governed by section 516.120 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.
This statute allows a petitioner to file suit up to five years from the date
of accrual8 0
In section 516.100 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, the Missouri
legislature provided some guidance for determining when a cause of

72. Id
73. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 237 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Mo. 1951); Neal v.
Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
74. See Baron v. Kurn, 164 S.W.2d 310,317 (Mo. 1942); Williams v. Malone,
592 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
75. Baron, 164 S.W.2d at 317.
76. Id.
77. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1986) (five year statute of limitation); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 400.2-725 (1986) (four year statute of limitation).
78. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 400.2-725, 516.120 (1986).
79. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120(4) (1986). The statute provides five years
from the date of accrual in which to bring the following actions:
An action for taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels,
including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for
any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on
contract and not herein otherwise enumerated.
Id.
80. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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action accrues."' This statute sets the time for accrual of a claim when
the "damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of
ascertainment." 2 In many cases the extent of the damage will depend
on uncertain future events.8 3 This uncertainty does not prevent the
plaintiff from filing suit, nor does it delay accrual of the cause of
action.'
The courts simply require that "some damages have been
sustained, so that the claimants know that they have a claim for some
amount. 85
Some plaintiffs have tried to avoid the bar of the statute of
limitations by arguing that the claim did not accrue until they discovered the specific cause of the damage.' Missouri courts have rejected
this argument except in limited circumstances.8 7 The cause of action
is said to accrue when the plaintiff first becomes aware that damage is
occurring.88

The word "ascertainment" always has been interpreted to mean
that some damage exists.8 9 As stated by the courts, knowledge of the
precise amount has never been a requirement to file suit.'
School District of Independence v. U.S. Gypslum91 was the most
recent case in Missouri dealing with property damage caused by the
presence of asbestos. Although this court did not address, specifically,

81. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.100 (1986). This statute'provides:
Civil actions, other than those for the recovery of real property,
can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in the following
sections, after the causes of action shall have accrued; provided, that
for the purposes of sections 516.100 to 516.370, the cause of action
shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical
breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting
therefrom is sustained and capable of ascertainment, and, if more
than one item of damage, then the last item, so that all resulting
damage may be recovered, and full and complete relief obtained.
!e.
82. Id.
83. Dixon v. Shafton, 649 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Lato v.
Concord Homes, Inc." 659 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
84. Dixon, 649 S.W.2d at 439.
85. Id.
86. SeeJepsonv. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307,312-13 (Mo. 1977) (enbane);Lato,
659 S.W.2d at 594.
87. The legislature adopted the "discovery" concept for fraud, Mo. REV.
STAT. § 516.120(5) (1986), and medical malpractice, Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105
(1986).
88. Lato, 659 S.W.2d at 595.
89. Id.
90. Dixon, 649 S.W.2d at 439.
91. 750 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/12
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the issue of accrual, the court focused on the necessity of damage to
create a cause of action.92 The school district sued for the cost of
removing asbestos from the school buildings. 93 The defendant argued
that the damage claimed was only for an injury to the product itself,
thus, it was not compensable.9 The court rejected this contention.
The school district stated a claim for present property damage.'
Although the injury, through contamination, was related to the future
risk of harm, the damages sought were the actual costs incurred to
abate the hazards of the product. 97 This is a present injury which is
ascertainable.
The school district claimed that the asbestos-containing product had
released fibers which contaminated the school buildings and their
contents.9" This contamination endangered the life and health of the
Although none of the school's occupants had
building's occupants.'
developed a disease, the plaintiffs were allowed to pursue their cause of
action."°
The Supreme Court specifically stated that the school
district "should not be forced to wait until disease manifests itself before
being permitted to maintain an action in tort.101
In W.R. Grace & Co., the petitioners claimed that the respondents
breached both the implied and express warranties. 0 2 The statute of
limitations governing the implied warranty claim at the Downtown
Airport is codified at section 516.120 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 10 3 This statute is applicable because the goods were purchased
prior to 1965."°4 The petitioners were given five years from accrual to
commence an action against the respondents.0 5 As noted above,
accrual of the cause of action occurs "when the damage resulting
therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment."'1 6

92. Id. at 454-55.
93. Id. at 444.
94. Id. at 454. The Missouri Supreme Court denied recovery in tort where
the only damage was to the product itself in Sharp Bros. v. American Hoist &
Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
95. School Dist. of Independence, 750 S.W.2d at 455.
96. Id. at 454.
97. Id. at 454-55.
98. Id. at 456.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 457.
101. Id.
102. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d at 267.
103. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120(4) (1986) is set forth in full supra note 78.
104. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d at 271.
105. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1986).
106. Id. § 516.100..
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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The express warranties concerning KCI are governed by section
400.2-725107 of the Missouri Revised Statutes since the products were
purchased after 1965.108 This statute allows a petitioner four years
from accrual in which to bring a cause of action.' ° 9 This statute also
provides that a claim accrues when the breach occurs regardless of the
buyer's lack of knowledge of the breach.110
In addition, the statute carves out an exception for warranties of
future performance. If an express warranty extends to the future
performance of the goods and the breach cannot be discovered until such
performance, accrual occurs when "the breach is or should have been
discovered.""1
Missouri courts consider certain factors in deciding whether a
warranty extends to future performance." 2 The statute requires that
the warranty "explicitly" refer to future performance." 3 Courts have
interpreted this provision to mean the warranty of future performance
must be "unambiguous, clearly stated, or distinctly set forth.""' 4 In
addition, the warranty language must guarantee the future performance
of the goods for a specified period of time." 5 Some courts have held

107. Id § 400.2-725.
108. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d at 272.
109. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-725(1) (1986). Section 400.2-725(1) provides:
An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the
original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to
not less than one year but may not extend it.
Id110. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-725(2) (1986). This statute provides in
pertinent part:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where
a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818,
822 (8th Cir. 1983); Black Leaf Prods. Co. v. Chemsico, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 827,830
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
113. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-725(2) (1986).
114.- R. W. Murray Co., 697 F.2d at 822.
115. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/12
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in quality or
defect
that a warranty stating a product is free from 11
6
workmanship is a warranty of future performance.
If an express warranty extends to future performance, the cause of
action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.' 17
In order to determine when the breach should have been discovered, the
courts have looked to the standard for an action in fraud. 118 The
fraud standard has been interpreted as the time when the plaintiff
knew or should have known the "controlling facts.""19 The Missouri
Supreme Court has held that if the petitioner could have discovered the
diligence, then he will be deemed
facts with the exercise of reasonable
2
to have discovered them.1
For fraudulent misrepresentation the governing statute is section
516.120(5) of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 121 Under this section, the
applicable statute of limitations is five years from the accrual of the
cause of action. 122 Missouri courts have deemed that accrual does not
occur until the "discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten
years, of the facts constituting fraud."'12 The plaintiff is then given
an additional five years in which to file suit. This statute has been
interpreted to mean that a plaintiff has fifteen years to bring an action
for fraud. I 2 If a party acts to conceal the fraud, however, the statute
is tolled until discovery of the fraud. 1'
As noted before, this statute places a duty on the plaintiff to make
an inquiry to discover the facts concerning the fraud. I'6 If the facts
are discoverable, the plaintiff will be deemed to know of the fraud and
the statute of limitations will begin to run against the claim.'2

116. E.g., Black Leaf Products, 678 S.W.2d at 830.
,117. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-725(2) (1986).
118. E.g., Black Leaf Products, 678 S.W.2d at 830-31.
119. Id. at 830.
120. Id. at 831 (citing Brown v. Irving-Pitt Mfg. Co., 292 S.W.2d 1023, 1025
(Mo. 1927)).
121. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d at 273.
122. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120(5) (1986). Section 516.120(5) grants a party
five years from the date of accrual. It provides:
An action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in
such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting
the fraud.
Id.
123. Id.
124. See Anderson v. Dyer, 456 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
125. See Obermeyer v. Kirshner, 38 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
126. Burr v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
127. Id. at 7.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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The final claim made by the petitioners in W.R. Grace & Co. was
based upon civil conspiracy. 12 This cause of action is also governed
by section 516.120 of the Missouri Revised Statutes." Thus, petitioners were given five years from accrual to file an action."
Accrual
occurs when the "damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment."13 ' Courts have interpreted the cause of action to begin upon
the occurrence of the last overt act charged that results in damage to
the plaintiff.' 32
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
In deciding the case at hand, the Missouri Court of Appeals
considered the accrual statutes and their implications. The Court
decided that petitioner's cause of action had not accrued prior to 1981.
The court of appeals found that the cause of action did not accrue
until the fibers actually contaminated the environment and the damage
was ascertainable."
Each claim was analyzed with respect to the
accrual statutes based on the seven sources of knowledge asserted by
the respondents."3 Because the accrual statutes require either that
the damage is sustained and "capable of ascertainment" or that the
plaintiff has "discovered" the facts surrounding the claim, the court
focused on the knowledge of the petitioners. The court determined that
the statutes
of limitations had not lapsed for any of the petitioner's
1
claims. '
The court found that the concerns about the construction workers
at KCI being exposed to asbestos were not sufficient to establish that
Kansas City knew the product presented a health hazard that required
removal of the products.3
The court also rejected the argument that the NESHAPS Report
137
gave Kansas City the requisite knowledge for their claims to accrue.
The NESHAPS Report neither required removal of the asbestos, 13 8 nor

128. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d at 273.

129. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1986).
,130. Id
131. Id. § 516.100.
132. Rippe v. Sutter, 292 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. 1956).
133. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d at 268.
134. Id. at 269-71.
135., Id at 275. The Court did affirm the grant of summary judgment for
the breach of express warranty claim with respect to Asbestospray. Id
136. Id. at 269.
137. Id
138. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/12
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addressed whether undisturbed asbestos would be a health hazard.3"
Thus, the court found that these regulations were limited to certain
circumstances which were not present in this case.
The problems experienced in Terminal A were also insufficient to
cause the petitioner's claims to accrue. 140 The evidence showed that
Kansas City was aware that asbestos fibers were released from coated
beams in Terminal A.'
An OSHA Report was filed at the time,
however, which concluded that the level of fibers in the air did not
exceed the limit permitted by federal standards. 42 Thus, Kansas City
was aware of the problems with the asbestos-containing products but
this did not establish knowledge that the asbestos presented an
unreasonable risk of harm. 143 Therefore, the court found that the
cause of action did not accrue.
The McCrone Report, relied upon by the respondents, merely found
that asbestos was present in Terminals B and C.'" The court believed that this could not by itself cause the statute of limitations to
145
begin to run.
The court also rejected the argument that the NIOSH Report
demonstrated knowledge on the part of Kansas City with respect to the
potential health hazard presented. 14 Because the report declared that
an immediate problem did not exist, the court found that environmental
contamination had not been established and
that an unreasonable risk
147
of harm was not capable of ascertainment.
Another source of knowledge urged by the respondents was the
belief of the City Health Department Manager that the asbestos posed
a serious health risk to the building's occupants."
The removal of
asbestos was encouraged by several individuals. Again the court found
no proof that the fibers had contaminated the air and that an unreasonable risk of harm was present.'4 9
The final assertion made by the respondents was based on the
knowledge of the scientific community5° The court rejected this
argument because some public health officials in the 1970's still believed

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id
Id. at 269-70.
I& at 269.
Id
Id. at 269-70.
Id at 270.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id
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there was a safe lower level of exposure.' 5' It was not until 1983 that
OSHA explicitly
declared that there was not a safe level of exposure to
152
asbestos.

The court believed there were genuine issues of material facts
concerning when the cause of action accrued for all claims governed by
the five year statute, section 516.120.1'
Thus, the court reversed
summary judgement on the negligence, strict liability, fraud, and the
civil conspiracy claims.
The breach of express warranty claims were examined in greater
detail because the petitioners claimed that the warranty extended to
future performance.'6
Defendant Asbestospray Corporation represented that its product was "easy to maintain," and it "provides a
permanent surface that will not crack, dust or flake."'5 5 Defendant
Keene Corporation represented that their product was tested and found
to have "resistance to air erosion 156
and nondusting properties," which
assured "the safety of application."
The problems experienced in Terminal A with cracking, dusting,
and flaking of the product along with the NIOSH Report established
damage from maintenance and the petitioner's ability to ascertain the
damage.'57 Thus, the appeals court affirmed the grant of summary
judgement for this claim against Asbestospray Corporation because the
statute of limitations barred the claim.
Because the Keene Corporation made representations about the
safety of its product, the court found that summary judgement was
improper. 158 The court concluded that there were genuine issues of
material facts with respect to the petitioner's knowledge of the hazards
of the product and its ability to ascertain the damage.
The court determined that genuine issues of material facts existed
for all of the causes of action pleaded by the petitioners except the
breach of the express warranty of future performance by Asbestospray 15 9 The court determined that a cause of action in tort does not
accrue until asbestos fibers are released into the environment, creating
an unreasonable risk of harm, because damage has not been sustained
that is capable of ascertainment.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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Id
Id at 271.
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Id. at 272.
Id.
Id
Id at 272-73.
Id. at 275.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

Kansas City v. W.R. Grace & Co. will affect many pending asbestos
cases. The court's determination that contamination is required to
cause a claim to accrue will place many asbestos manufacturers in
danger of liability even though they believed the statute of limitations
had run.
In addition, the court's decision will affect the accrual of a cause of
action in many other cases. This decision may cause confusion and
disparate results in different courts. The standard set forth by the court
does not clearly state when the damage was sustained or even when the
damage is capable of ascertainment. The seven sources of knowledge
set forth by the respondents were rejected by the court. The rationale
behind this determination is unclear.
The court focused on the discussion of contamination in School

District of Independence v. U.S. Gypsum. 16

This particular case did

not address the accrual issue. Because Missouri courts do not permit
recovery in tort when the product sold is the only thing damaged, the
plaintiffs argued "contamination" had damaged the fixtures, curtains
and rugs, and other similar property.'6 ' The court accepted this
argument of contamination of the school's environment as sufficient to
allow a strict liability claim. The court reasoned that there was
162
property damage rather than just damage to the product itself.
U.S. Gypsum, however, does not stand for the proposition that a cause
of action in tort for property damage due to asbestos does not accrue
until asbestos fibers are released into the environment and the plaintiff
is able to ascertain an unreasonable risk of harm.

If School District of Independence v. U.S. Gypsum'6 stood for this
proposition, Kansas City's claims would not have accrued yet. The
Hygienetics Report which was completed in 1985 did not establish that
an unreasonably dangerous level of asbestos fibers was released into the
environment."M The Report did recommend that the products be
removed and replaced, but only as part of the regular maintenance of
the building.'( Thus, if the court accepted the plaintiff's argument
that accrual requires "contamination," the present case would have to
have been dismissed because the cause of action had yet to accrue.

160. 750 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
161. See Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703
S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
162. School Dist. of Independence, 750 S.W.2d at 456.
163. 750 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
164. W.R. Grace & Co., 778 S.W.2d at 270-71.
165. Id. at 271.
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The Hygienetics report does not differ substantially from the
NIOSH Report of 1977. If the court believes the Hygienetics Report
caused the claims to accrue, it is not clear why the NIOSH Report would
not have done so at an earlier date.
There were some competing policy issues involved in this decision.
The courts must have wrestled with the deprivation of the plaintiffs day
in court. It seems unjust to deny an injured party the opportunity to
recover for its losses which were caused by the defendant. The asbestoscontaining products will either have to be removed or sealed-either one
at a great cost to Kansas City. It would seem fair to force the companies who sold the products to face the consequences of having placed the
product on the market since they benefitted from the sales.
Statutes of limitations, however, are favored in the law. 16 They
were enacted to prevent the institution of stale claims. It seems
inequitable to allow the plaintiff to benefit from its unwarranted delay
in filing suit. It would make more sense to require the plaintiff to
investigate a possible claim for damage. Facts existed which would
have put a reasonable person on notice that he may have had a possible
cause of action against the defendant. It would not be unjust to make
the petitioner suffer for its own lack of diligence.
Accrual of a cause of action generally is measured at one of three
times: when the original act causing the damage is completed, when
the plaintiff becomes aware or should have become aware of the
possibility of an injury, or when the harm is fully manifested. In order
to illustrate these more clearly, an analogy can be drawn. If a
contractor installs faulty wiring in a home, when does the cause of
action accrue?
The first possible moment from which to measure the statute would
be when the original act of installing the faulty wiring was completed.
This might produce unjust results if the defect was latent and the
plaintiff was unaware of a problem. The second possible time from
which to measure accrual would be when the homeowner discovers the
faulty wiring. This seems logical since the plaintiff now is aware of a
claim for damages and can pursue his cause of action. This measuring
point would be much more consistent with the important economic
concept of mitigating damages. The third time from which to measure
accrual would be when harm results from the damage. This may occur
when the house catches on fire due to the faulty wiring. Clearly, this
would seem to be the most illogical measure. Why should we require
plaintiffs to suffer harm beyond the initial damage in order to cause
their claims to accrue? Yet, this seems to be the one the court is
advocating in the present case.

166. Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974);
Hunter v. Hunter, 237 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Mo. 1951).
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The Missouri statute provides that the cause of action accrues when
"damage... is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.', 167 This
would seem to embody the second measure of time illustrated
above-when the plaintiff becomes aware or should have become aware
of the possibility of injury. The damage was sustained when the wrong
was done. The cause of action should accrue when the plaintiff learns
of his damage.
Missouri's adoption of the "capable of ascertainment" test represents the legislature's recognition that the act which triggers the accrual
of a cause of action should not refer to the "technical" breach of duty but
to a practical remedy."6 Missouri case law indicates this language
has been interpreted to refer to the time when the plaintiffs
first
169
became aware that they may have a possible claim for damage.
Most other jurisdictions follow an approach which requires that the
plaintiff have some degree of knowledge for the cause of action to
accrue. 70 For example, one state marks accrual when the property is
"first visibly affected" which seems to indicate that the plaintiffs were
put on notice of a potential claim. 171 Other states start the statute
17 2
running at the earliest time mentioned-at the time of installation.
All of these different measuring points indicate either the first or the
second possible measure of my illustration, not the third. This is
because it is illogical to require the damage to be fully manifested in
order for accrual to occur.
As stated previously, however, the third measure seems to be what
the court is advocating in this asbestos case. The damage was capable
of ascertainment prior to 1981. This is demonstrated by the seven
sources of knowledge that the defendants presented to the court. Thus,
the plaintiffs were put on notice that they had a potential claim prior
to 1981.
Other jurisdictions have addressed specifically the accrual of a
cause of action for asbestos abatement. Recently, the Florida District

167. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100 (1986).
168. Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REv. 1177, 1205 (1950).
169. See Dixon v. Shafton, 649 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Lato v.
Concord Homes, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
170. See, e.g., City of Omaha v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 767
F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1985); Almand Constr. Co. v. Evans, 547 So. 2d 626 (Fla.
1989).
171. Hickman v. North Sterling Irrigation Dist., 748 P.2d 1349 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1987).
172. Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 381 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
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The owner of a building
Court of Appeal addressed this issue. 1"'
brought suit against the seller of asbestos-containing material which
was used in the building. 1 4 The court found that the cause of action
was barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff could have
discovered the presence of the asbestos in the building prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations. "1 5 Thus, the court did not even
require knowledge on the part of the plaintiff, only that they could have
discovered the problem through due diligence.
The Supreme Court of Vermont also faced this same issue. The
University of Vermont filed suit for property damage against a chemical
manufacturer of asbestos-containing products.'1 6 The court denied
summary judgement based on the statute of limitations because
Vermont case law provides that a cause of action does not accrue "until
the plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
17
have discovered both the fact of his injury and the cause thereof."
In this case, the cause of action was not deemed to accrue until the
school officials had determined which product contained the asbestos
and, thus, which product had caused the harm.1 8 This case can be
distinguished from the present case because the plaintiff knew which
products contained the asbestos.
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue in two recent
In answer to a certified question from
cases applying Georgia law.'
the Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the
Georgia
"discovery" rule applied only to cases of bodily injury."s
commences the running of the statute of limitations when the asbestosthan when it is discovered that
containing material is installed, rather
8
the material poses a health hazard.1 '

173. Times Publishing Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 552 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
174. Id. at 315.
175. Id.
176. University of Vt. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 565 A.2d 1354 (Vt. 1989).
177. Id. at 1357 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Abbott Laboratories, 145 Vt. 516,
521-26, 496 A.2d 154, 160-61 (1985)).
178. University of Vt., 565 A.2d at 1357-58.
179. Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 877 F.2d 35 (11th
Cir. 1989); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Celotex Corp., 874 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1989).
180. Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 368 S.E.2d 732
(1988).
181. CorporationofMercer Univ., 877 F.2d at 36; St. Joseph Hosp., 874 F.2d
at 765.
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The most recent case which denied summary judgement to the
defendants was in the United States District Court of Connecticut.'8 2
The Connecticut statute provides that the cause of action does not
accrue "until the property damage is first sustained or discovered or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.' 83 The
defendants did not present enough evidence to establish when the
plaintiff had the requisite knowledge to commence the running of the
statute of limitations.'8 This case may be distinguished on this fact
alone. The Connecticut court made a clear statement that it did not
intend to comment about whether the action was timely filed but only
that summary judgement was improper.'8
It seems clear that Missouri's decision is contrary to the majority
of jurisdictions. The other courts have focused on the plaintiff's
knowledge of the damage. They did not require "contamination" to start
the statute of limitations running.
V. CONCLUSION
Kansas City sustained damage that was capable of ascertainment
prior to 1981. The damage was sustained when the asbestos was
installed in the building. When the damage became ascertainable,
Kansas City should have filed suit. It would seem logical that the
damage was capable of ascertainment when the petitioner became
aware that asbestos presented an unreasonable health hazard. The
seven sources of knowledge alleged by the respondents seem to favor the
inference that Kansas City did have the requisite knowledge to cause
their claims to accrue.
In deciding as it did, the Missouri Court of Appeals has acted
contrary to public policy and the apparent wishes of the Missouri
Legislature. Statutes of limitations set expectations of when a party is
open to suit. By its decision, the court has created uncertainty in an
area of the law that requires stability.
SANDRA J. COULTER

182. West Haven School Dist. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 721 F.
Supp. 1547 (D. Conn. 1988).
183. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577(a) (1977).
184. West Haven School Dist., 721 F. Supp. at 1556.
185. Id.
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